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This paper describes and analyses Vision 2023 Turkish National Technology Foresight 
Program.  The  paper  is  not  about  a  mere  description  of  the  activities  undertaken.  It 
analyses the Program from a contextualist perspective, where the Program is considered 
in its own national and organizational contexts by discussing how the factors in these 
contexts led to the particular decisions taken and approaches adopted when the exercise 
was organized, designed and practiced. With the description and analysis of the Vision 
2023  Technology  Foresight  Program,  the  paper  suggests  that  each  Foresight  exercise 
should be considered in its own context. The exercise should be organized, designed and 
practiced by considering the effects of the  external contexts (national, regional  and/or 
corporate) and organizational factors stemming from these different context levels along 
with the nature of the issue being worked on, which constitute the content of the exercise.   
 
Keywords:  Foresight,  contextualism,  Vision  2023,  Turkey,  Science  and  Technology 
Policy     2 
1. Introduction 
As practiced  institutional Foresight is an outgrowth  of a long  and historic  tradition  of 
foresight. Stemming from the unavoidable human trait of foresight as a concept, and from 
planning and forecasting as a structured activity, institutional Foresight essentially implies 
some  form  of  “participative  vision-based  planning  process”  [1,  p.15].  Institutional 
Foresight has been adopted widely in the last couple of decades particularly at national 
level and has become an activity associated with participative public policy making. In 
government circles the activity is widely acclaimed for policy-making and scarce resources 
are allocated based on advises coming from institutional Foresight activities. The exercises 
have been lengthily organized and carried out by government advisory boards, research 
councils, national academy of sciences, or government departments. 
 
Initially the main activity area was largely limited to Science and Technology (S&T) issues. 
This was due to the recognition of the inevitability of long-term research planning in an era 
of increasing competition at the global level. In recent years the application areas have 
been  widened,  since  there  has  been  wider  acknowledgement  of  importance  of  social 
concerns. Now, the breadth of activities varies from covering the entire spectrum of fields, 
to a single specific field at a project level. However, it can be said that technology is still a 
major area of activity of the most Foresight programs. 
 
Referring to the rapid diffusion of Technology Foresight during the 1990s, Martin and 
Johnston [2] and Martin [3] identify three drivers: 
·  Escalation in industrial and economic competition. Due to the competition in the 
global economy, innovation and development of new technologies are becoming 
more  crucial  for  industrialized  and  industrializing  countries.  This  is  where  the 
primary role of Foresight arises as to identify emerging technologies, which are 
likely  to  have  significant  impact  on  industry,  the  economy,  society  and  the 
environment over coming decades, at an early stage 
·  Increasing  pressure  on  government  spending.  Because  of  limited  government 
resources, like other areas of public spending, research and technology cannot be 
fully  funded  by  the  government.  Foresight  is  presented  as  a  process  to  help 
identification of funding priorities 
·  Changing  nature  of  knowledge  production.  The  identification  of  emerging 
technologies and the prioritization of research and technology areas point to the   3 
increasing  need  for  communication,  networks,  partnerships  and  collaboration 
among researchers and between researchers, industry as the performers and users of 
the research, government and other relevant stakeholders. Foresight offers a means 
for  developing  and  strengthening  those  linkages.  In  this  context,  Martin  and 
Johnston (ibid.) see Foresight as a useful activity for ‘wiring-up’ and strengthening 
National Systems of Innovation
4 
 
Keenan [4] mentions two further drivers to acknowledge the wide adoption of activities 
around the globe: 
·  Bandwagon effects. To a considerable extent the diffusion of institutional Foresight 
is  due  to  the  competition  between  countries.  As  one  country  has  undertaken  a 
Foresight exercise, ‘competitor’ countries feel the need to follow this trend 
·  Millennium effect. Governments all over the world initiated exercise to appear to be 
prepared for the new opportunities and challenges in the twenty-first century 
 
Initiated with these kinds of motivations, Foresight exercises focused mainly on industrial 
and  service  sectors  with  the  considerations  given  on  technology-push  and  market-pull. 
Participation  was  mostly  limited  to  experts  from  academia,  industry  and  government 
representatives,  which  were  drawn  from  the  scientific  bodies  of  government  in  the 
nominated  sectors.  During  the  exercises  a  combination  of  creative  and  consultative 
methods was used (e.g. different combinations of the methods like Delphi, expert panels, 
brainstorming and scenarios was common). The formal products of such exercises were 
largely a matter of research priorities and strategies for the different aspects of S&T. 
 
Around the globe, the US and Japan can be considered as the pioneers of institutional 
Foresight efforts since the 1960s. These initial efforts were followed by the practices of 
European governments starting from the late 1980s. The Netherlands, Germany, the UK 
and France are among the first countries in Europe initiated Foresight exercises. All these 
countries  have  experienced  Foresight  in  more  than  once.  Rapid  diffusion  of  Foresight 
activities from developed to developing countries was observed during the second half of 
the  1990s.  In  Europe,  the  activities  became  more  common  among  many  of  the  new 
members of the EU and Candidate Countries. Some of these countries have undertaken 
                                                
4 How  capable  the  current  Foresight  practices  to  fulfil  this  function  is  discussed  extensively  by  Saritas 
(2006a), who introduces the concept of “Systemic Foresight”.   4 
full-scale national exercises such as Hungary and Czech Republic, whilst the others were 
rather  modest  efforts,  which  were  more  about  capacity  building  such  as  the  ones 
undertaken in Malta, Cyprus, Estonia and Bulgaria. All these exercises have mainly aimed 
to set priorities and restructure national research systems in preparation for joining the EU.  
 
As one of the Candidate Countries for the EU membership, Turkey has also carried out a 
national  level  Foresight  exercise,  called  ‘Vision  2023  Turkish  National  Technology 
Foresight Program’.
5 Along with the Technology Foresight Program, Vision 2023 involved 
three more sub-projects (called “R&D Manpower”, “Technological Capabilities Inventory” 
and “National R&D Infrastructure”) which aimed at collecting data on the current science, 
technology and innovation capacity of the country. The main focus of the paper is the 
Technology Foresight Program.  
 
In  the  following  sections,  the  Program  will  be  described  and  discussed  from  a 
‘contextualist’  perspective.  For  this  purpose  first  the  contextualist  perspective  will  be 
introduced in the second section. Then, in the third section, the background and rationales 
of  the  Vision  2023  Technology  Foresight  Exercise  will  be  summarized.  The  context, 
content and the designed process of the exercise will be specified in the fourth section. 
Subsequently, the actual process will be summarized and how the context, content and 
process of the exercise were interacted during the execution phase will be discussed and 
exemplified from the contextualist perspective. Following the analysis of the outcomes of 
the exercise in the sixth section, conclusions will be drawn up in the final section. 
 
2. The “contextualist perspective” 
In  his  “Systemic  Foresight”  concept,  Saritas  [1]  mentions  the  interrelatedness  of  the 
context, content and process of institutional Foresight exercises. The firm relationships 
between the context, content and process of change were described by Pepper [5]. From a 
contextualist perspective Pepper [5] states that an event should be adequately described in 
its  context.  In  the  contextual  analysis,  the  elements  of  context  should  be  consciously 
searched for and analyzed; evidence on such elements as history, stakeholder perspectives, 
infrastructure and informal systems should be collected by reviewing and scanning. These 
                                                
5 Among the authors of the current paper, Turgut Tumer was the Coordinator of the Vision 2023 Project and 
Erol Taymaz acted as the Project Consultant.   5 
ideas have been expanded by Pettigrew [6] and Pettigrew and Wipp [7] and were adapted 
to organizational settings to manage the change process in organizations.  
 
The core concepts in contextualism are ‘context’, ‘content’ and ‘process’. If the task is the 
understanding  of  and  intervention  in  an  ever-changing  system,  this  implies  the 
representation of: 
1.  The context in which the change occurs 
2.  The content of the change activity 
3.  The process of change 
The main objective of contextual research is to trace their dynamic interaction over time 
and provide explanations on how they interact and shape each other. 
 
Saritas [1] suggests that any change activity, like institutional Foresight, should be linked 
to broader contexts. A system’s behavior cannot be understood and improvements in the 
system cannot be provided by taking it apart from the larger system that it is embedded in, 
but rather by viewing it as part of a larger system. Thus, institutional Foresight activities 
should  not  be  worked  and  described  as  episodes  divorced  from  the  historical,  social, 
political, economic and organizational circumstances from which they emerge.  
 
Pettigrew [6] distinguishes two levels of context where he claims that any change occurs: 
External (outer) and Internal (inner) contexts. The outer context represents macro-scale 
environments outside the border of the organization, where organization has limited or no 
control. Predicted and unpredicted trends, shifts and turbulences lie in the outer context. 
The  inner  context  includes  structural,  political  and  cultural  elements  within  the 
organization. Similarly, Saritas [1] states that, as a change activity, institutional Foresight 
is  embedded  in  these  two  contexts.  Social,  technological,  economic,  ecological  and 
political systems represent the external context, where the exercise takes place and thus is 
influenced by the factors in it. On the other hand, the exercise is expected to improve or 
change one or more parts of these surrounding systems. Thus the context produces and is 
then re-produced by the institutional Foresight exercises. Internal context relates to the 
structures  (e.g. internal processes,  procedures, equipments,  technologies)  and  behaviors 
(e.g.  culture,  politics,  social  interaction,  skills,  motivation,  power,  management  styles) 
within the organization, where institutional Foresight is organized and carried out.  
   6 
The external and internal contexts are the determinants of the content and process of the 
exercise. Pettigrew [6] defines the term content as: “particular areas of transformation 
under examination”. In terms of institutional Foresight the content refers to subject area(s) 
taken into consideration and the ideas created related to them during Foresight exercises. 
The main goal of an exercise is to introduce ideas for change on the content in order to 
provide improvements in the context of the exercise.  
 
In this respect, a rich understanding of the context and content is the first and foremost 
requirement for the design of the process of the exercise. Process includes the activities 
and supporting decisions leading to change [8]. In strategic terms, process is the sequence 
of events and activities through which “conversations” about strategy unfold over time [9]. 
In the theory of contextualism, which has an underlying process perspective, process is 
described  as  “a  sequence  of  individual  and  collective  events,  actions  and  activities 
unfolding over time in context” [6]. The contextualist perspective implies that: 
1.  The  fit  or  convergence  between  context,  content  and  process  is  crucial  to  the 
achievement of change and further improvement via effective decision-making and 
successful implementation, and 
2.  The linkages among these constructs are reciprocal and continuous. 
 
Having the firm linkage between the context, content and process of the exercise in mind, 
the paper first describes the background and development of the S&T policy making in 
Turkey, which constituted the external context of the exercise. How the drivers to initiate a 
Foresight  exercise  arose  from  this  context  will  be  explained.  Subsequently,  the 
construction of the content of the exercise captured from the external context as the areas 
of investigation will be mentioned. Finally, how the design and deployment of the exercise 
were influenced by the external and internal contexts and content of the exercise will be 
demonstrated. Thus how the characteristics of the social, economic and political systems in 
the country and the structural and behavioral aspects of the Foresight organization found 
their reflections on the design and deployment of the exercise will be emphasized. This 
will underline the uniqueness of Foresight exercises and the need for a unique approach for 
the design and deployment of each Foresight exercise.  
 
 
   7 
3. Towards a national Technology Foresight program in Turkey 
Understanding the circumstances of the exercise is important for the recognition of the 
context, under which the content of the Program was determined and the Program was 
designed and deployed. For this purpose, first, the background of Turkish National S&T 
policy-making will be outlined briefly. Then, how the idea of using Technology Foresight 
arose through the evolution of S&T policy-making in Turkey will be discussed.  
 
3.1 Background of Turkish National Science and Technology Policy-making 
Although  the  Turkish  Republic  has  striven  to  further  social,  economic  and  industrial 
development since its foundation in 1923, the first attempts to formulate S&T policies 
started with the beginning of the planned economic period with the introduction of the First 
Five  Year  National  Development  Plan  in  1963  [10].  The  Scientific  and  Technological 
Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) was established in the same year for the purpose of: 
1.  Organizing, coordinating and promoting basic and applied research 
2.  Directing research activities to the targets of the national development plan 
3.  Setting research priorities [11] 
 
During  the  1960s  and  1970s,  the  S&T  policy  in  Turkey  was  mainly  based  on  the 
‘promotion of basic and applied research in natural sciences’. In this early phase, the S&T 
policies were formulated by TUBITAK without any official policy document through a 
tacit consensus with the government [10]. In these earlier attempts there was a lack of 
participatory policy-making culture. Most decisions in the government and government 
agencies have been based on extremely short term necessities and piecemeal policies. The 
concept  of  technology  policy  and  its  integration  with  the  industrial,  employment  and 
investment policies has been introduced in the Fourth Five Year National Development 
Plan covering the period 1973-1977. 
 
The first detailed S&T policy document in Turkey entitled, “Turkish Science Policy: 1983-
2003”, was prepared in 1983. Over 300 experts contributed to the document under the 
coordination of the Ministry of State. This was the first time the role of technology for 
development was explicitly recognized and priority areas of technology were suggested. 
Although  this  study  was  not  a  Foresight  exercise,  the  technology  areas  were  broadly 
identified. Therefore, according to Pak et al. [10], it can be regarded as the first attempt 
towards defining “critical technologies” in Turkey. Subsequently, the Supreme Council for   8 
Science and Technology (SCST) was established. As the highest S&T policy-making body, 
the SCST enabled designing S&T policies with the participation of the actors which take 
part in the management of economic and social life in Turkey.
 6  
 
The SCST had its first operational meeting only in 1989. In the mid-1990s, the SCST 
started  to  play  an  active  role  in  formulating  the  national  S&T  policy  as  the  central 
component of the National Innovation System. In its second meeting in 1993, the SCST 
approved the document entitled “Turkish Science and Technology  Policy: 1993-2003”. 
This document paved the way for new policy initiatives, such as R&D support programs in 
the 1990s. This was a turning point in the history of S&T policy-making in Turkey as there 
was a paradigm shift from “building a modern R&D infrastructure” to “innovation oriented 
national S&T policies”. The policies formulated in this document was further elaborated in 
1995 with “A Project for Impetus in Science and Technology”, which formed the S&T 
chapter of the Seventh Five Year National Development Plan for the period of 1996-2000.  
 
In its sixth meeting on December 13, 2000, the SCST underlined the fact that superiority in 
S&T is the  determinant factor in relocation  of world’s resources and in increasing the 
welfare of the society. Along these guidelines, the SCST decided that new S&T policies 
should be formulated, and priority areas should be set for the time period covering 2002-
2023
7. As the general secretariat of the SCST, TUBITAK detailed the project accordingly 
and  named  it  “Vision  2023:  Science  and  Technology  Strategies”.  The  project  was 
approved by the SCST a year later in its seventh meeting on December 24, 2001 [10]. The 
implementation of the project started in January 2002, and the project was planned to be 
completed in December 2003.  
 
3.2 Rationales for using Technology Foresight in Vision 2023 
Starting from the 1960s, TUBITAK prepared long term S&T policy documents by using 
desk-based methods. However, all these documents were of very limited use. In spite of 
the attempts to develop long term technology policy, there was little success in realizing 
                                                
6 Chaired by the Prime Minister or his deputy the SCST consists of the Ministers of State; Education; Finance; 
Defence;  Industry  and  Commerce;  Health;  Energy  and  Natural  Resources;  Agriculture,  Forestry  and 
Environment; and Undersecretaries in charge of State Planning Organisation, Tresuary and Foresign Trade, 
as well as the Presidents of Higher Education Council, TUBITAK, Turkish Atomic Energy Commission, two 
leading universities, Turkish Broadcasting Corporation and the Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, 
Maritime Trade and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey [11]. 
7 The year 2023 marks the 100
th Anniversary of the foundation of the Turkish Republic   9 
concerted actions. Analyzing the policies and strategies in the development plans from a 
systems thinking perspective, Oner and Saritas [12] attempt to answer the question “why 
did the development plans fail to meet their targets in Turkey?”. Oner and Saritas [12] 
extract the sectoral policies and strategies and analyze them by using their “Integrated 
Development Management Model”. However, the assessment of S&T policy documents 
indicates  that  the  S&T  policy  measures  cannot  be  blamed  merely  because  of  their 
limitations. In Turkey, the implementation of the S&T policies has also been problematic 
due to [13] [14]: 
1.  The lack of long-term and strategic approach to S&T issues 
2.  The lack of ownership of the R&D agenda by stakeholders and society 
3.  The lack of political support 
4.  A low level of dissemination 
5.  Isolated S&T policies 
6.  The fragmentation of researchers and resources 
 
As  a  solution,  TUBITAK  introduced  the  idea  of  initiating  an  institutional  Foresight 
exercise. The SCST was suggested that Foresight would be a useful tool to overcome the 
problems related to the lack of participation, isolation and fragmentation in the formulation 
and implementation of the S&T policies. The implementation was only possible through 
ownership that could only be provided through the extensive involvement of the society. 
The involvement of wider society could bring political support together. In addition, the 
integration of S&T policies and other sectoral policies would be possible in a Foresight 
exercise with the involvement of sectors in the economy as the initiators and implementers 
of these policies. 
 
In line with the above-mentioned rationales, Vision 2023 Technology Foresight Program 
started in order to: 
1.  Build an S&T vision for Turkey 
2.  Determine strategic technologies and priority areas of R&D 
3.  Formulate S&T policies of Turkey for the next 20-year period 
4.  Get a wide spectrum of stakeholders involved in the process, thus to gain their 
support 
5.  Create  public  awareness  on  the  importance  of  S&T  for  socio-economic 
development [15]     10 
4. The context, content and process of the exercise 
Following the description of the way to initiate a Foresight exercise, next three sections 
will specify the context, content and process of the exercise respectively. The clarification 
of context, content and process with a contextualist perspective will help to identify the 
factors which affect the actual Foresight process and have influence on the outputs and 
outcomes produced, thus on the success and benefits of the exercise. 
 
4.1 The context of the exercise 
The exercise aimed to identify the areas for the improvement of the S&T systems. The 
economic sectors were seen as the area to focus on to scan the signals in order to identify 
S&T areas for the future. While doing that it was considered that it would also be useful to 
focus on some social themes which could be inherent in S&T and economic systems. Thus 
the external context of the exercise consists of mainly S&T and economic systems with 
considerations given on the social system. 
 
Regarding the internal context, the host and also the main sponsor, client and organizer of 
the exercise was TUBITAK. This was a unique aspect of the exercise where a national 
public  institution  initiated  a  Foresight  program  by  using  its  own  resources  for  the 
development  of  its  own  policies.  Besides  monetary  resources,  human  resources  and 
expertise  were  also  provided  by  TUBITAK  as  the  coordinator  of  the  Program.  A 
Management  Team  was  constructed  in  TUBITAK.  The  Management  Team  involved 
people who had professional competence in project management, research, policy-making 
and  communication  skills.  Then  a  Project  Office  was  formed  within  the  S&T  Policy 
Department of TUBITAK. The Project Office was responsible for the implementation of 
the project. 
 
The Steering Committee was the highest ruling body in the Program. When the Steering 
Committee was constructed, it was tried to be inclusive. Therefore it was consisted of 65 
members,  including  27  representatives  from  the  governmental  institutions,  29  from 
industrial organizations and NGOs, and 9 from the universities. The Steering Committee 
guided the project by taking the strategic decisions and approving the reports and policy 
recommendations generated during the implementation of the Program. Operational and 
budgetary decisions were taken by the Executive Committee. Chaired by the president of   11 
TUBITAK,  the  Executive  Committee  brought  together  the  three  representatives  of  the 
Steering Committee with the related administrative officials of TUBITAK. 
 
Besides  internal  expertise,  external  expertise  was  also  mobilized  in  the  Program.  The 
Department of Policy Research in Engineering, Science and Technology (PREST) in the 
University of Manchester informed a group of panel members and the Project Office on the 
UK Technology Foresight experience. PREST also formally cooperated during the phase 
of preparing the Delphi variables for the assessment of the Delphi topic statements.  
 
4.2 The content of the exercise 
The Program was decided to be holistic, which meant that all the “important” sectors in the 
economy  were  covered.  The  main  reason  for  focusing  on  the  economic  sectors  was 
because they were seen as the only structured (i.e. very clearly defined and distinct) body 
to learn the demands from S&T in the policy formulation process. It was considered that 
successful S&T policies should consider the demands from the sectors. 
 
In its first meeting in April 2002, the Steering Committee aimed to select the sectors to be 
focused  upon.  First  a  broad  list  of  sectors  suggested  by  the  members  of  the  Steering 
Committee was created. Then a cluster analysis was applied to aggregate those sectors that 
are considered  to  be  ‘related’  for the purpose  of  the  Program.  Subsequently,  as set  of 
criteria were drawn up to prioritize the sectors in the list. The exercise was considered to 
cover: 
1.  The sectors in which Turkey has competitive advantages today and will likely to 
have in the next 20 years. 
2.  The sectors which are technology and policy relevant. For instance, if the success 
of a sector is not dependant on S&T policies, but to other policies (e.g. financial 
policies), it was considered to be outside the list. 
The members of the Steering Committee were also suggested that the ideal number of 
selected sectors should be around 8-10, which would be a manageable size for the exercise.   
 
Following a voting session, the Steering Committee members prioritized and selected nine 
technology and policy relevant sectors which underpin the competitiveness and economic 
development in the country including: 
1.  Information and Communication   12 
2.  Energy and Natural Resources 
3.  Health and Pharmaceuticals 
4.  Defense, Aeronautics and Space Industries 
5.  Agriculture and Food 
6.  Manufacturing and Materials 
7.  Transportation and Tourism 
8.  Chemicals and Textiles 
9.  Construction and Infrastructure  
 
Besides  nine  economic  sectors,  two  cross-cutting  thematic  areas  were  covered  in  the 
Program including: 
1.  Education and Human Resources 
2.  Environment and Sustainable Development 
All these 11 areas identified constituted the content of the exercise. 
 
4.3 The designed process of the exercise 
This was the first attempt by Turkey to run a Foresight exercise at the national level. With 
the  personal  efforts  of  several  staff  members,  who  had  learned  about  Foresight  in  an 
international training program, TUBITAK proposed the use of Foresight for S&T policy 
making in an SCST meeting. Foresight was seen as a widespread practice in many EU and 
Candidate Countries in a ‘fashionable’ way. It was considered to be a useful policy-making 
tool for Turkey, where the formulation and implementation of S&T policies had always 
been problematic.  
 
As a first step of the process design, TUBITAK analyzed the Foresight programs of other 
countries (e.g. British, Czech, Dutch, German, Hungarian, Japanese and Korean national 
programs and the work in the US). During the analyses they noticed the widespread use of 
various methods including expert panels, scenarios, and the Delphi as the backbones of 
many  national  Foresight  exercises.  Following  the  discussions  on  the  methods,  a 
combination  of expert  panels  and the Delphi method  were selected. The use of  macro 
scenarios was also discussed. A few macro scenarios could be built and given to the panels 
prior to their works. Then, it was considered that the pre-determined scenarios would affect 
the way panels think and create ideas. It would not be desirable to limit the panel work 
with top-down scenarios.    13 
 
Scenarios were also not preferred because of the lack of experience. The construction of 
scenarios was seen more difficult and ambiguous compared to the Delphi, which has clear 
and systematic steps.
8 Considering the capabilities of the organization the application of 
the scenario method was seen risky. This situation can be considered as an example to 
demonstrate  how  a  factor  in  the  internal  context  (organizational  capabilities)  was 
influential on the methodological decisions taken in the process of the exercise. 
 
The methodology designed for the Technology Foresight Program involved expert panels, 
a two-round Delphi survey to be executed by the project office in coordination with the 
panels, and a prioritization scheme. Representing the technology demand side, the panels 
were  given  the  task  of  building  their  own  visions  and  setting  socio-economic  targets; 
sharing  these  visions  and  targets  with  the  society  by  wider  consultation;  and  listing 
underpinning technologies and prioritizing them. The Delphi process, which represented 
the technology supply side, aimed at addressing the likelihood of achieving technological 
developments as well as testing them against a set of criteria determined by the Steering 
Committee.  With  the  aim  of  assessing  the  comparative  degree  of  contribution  of 
technologies to Turkey a set of prioritization criteria was drawn. 
 
A standard ‘task definition’ document was prepared and distributed to all the Panels in 
order to guide them on how to carry out project tasks. There were four main tasks in the 
document: 
1.  Vision building 
2.  Dissemination 
3.  Delphi survey 
4.  Policy proposals 
 
The steps necessary to be taken in each phase were described under these headings in a 
two-page  document.  The  given  tasks  were  common  for  all  the  Panels  in  the  exercise. 
Through the task definition document, the panels were assigned [17]:  
·  To evaluate current state of their sectors via the analysis of trends and drivers, 
desk-based research and SWOT analysis,  
                                                
8 The Delphi method has its own pitfalls, though. For a discussion on the shortcomings of the Delphi method, 
see [16].   14 
·  To build a vision with brainstorming sessions  
·  To set socio-economic targets and determine technology activity areas necessary to 
reach these targets   
·  To prioritize technology activity areas by voting 
·  To consult a wider expert group through a Delphi survey for  their opinions  on 
prioritization 
·  To propose policies on prioritized areas with the evaluation of the previous work 
Having these tasks assigned, the panels were also given some leeway to carry out their 
tasks. They were allowed to work in different ways and to use different methods to achieve 
the expected outputs.  
 
5. The practice of Vision 2023  
Following the description of the context, content and the designed process of the exercise 
from a contextualist perspective, the attention is now turned to the actual process of the 
exercise, where the program-as-designed is put into practice. In this manner first how the 
program was executed is presented. Subsequently, the interactions between the context, 
content and process during the execution of the program are discussed.   
 
5.1 The execution of the exercise 
The panels initially built their vision and listed underpinning technologies. For this purpose 
around 200 panel meetings and enlarged workshops took place from the first panel meeting 
on  July  3,  2002  to  January  24,  2003.  This  phase  ended  with  the  completion  of  the 
preliminary reports. The Deputy Prime Minister in charge of S&T issues announced the 
completion of the reports at a press conference on January 28, 2003. The Minister also 
invited criticisms and contributions to the preliminary panel reports, which were available 
on  the project web site. This wider consultation period also  involved several activities 
planned by each panel for disseminating their initial works among the related actors in the 
field. 
 
With  the  addition of  Chemicals  and  Textiles separated as two  independent  panels,  the 
preliminary reports of the 12 Foresight panels were presented in a common format and 
addressed the following points with regards to their areas of interest: 
·  Trends and issues, which are likely to affect the world and Turkey   15 
·  Assessment of Turkey’s current standing (SWOT analysis) 
·  Turkey’s 2023 vision for each sector  
·  Socio-economic objectives to be achieved in order to realize those visions 
·  S&T  competencies  and underpinning  technologies  needed  to achieve the  socio-
economic objectives 
 
Following the publication of the preliminary reports the Delphi process started. As stated 
earlier, the Delphi survey aimed at addressing the likelihood of achieving the envisaged 
technological  developments  as  well  as  testing  them  against  a  set  of  criteria 
(variables/questions)  determined  by  the  Steering  Committee.
9  The  technological 
developments were assessed by considering their effects on: (1) Competitive strength, (2) 
S&T  innovation  capability,  (3)  Environment  and  energy  efficiency,  (4)  Creation  of 
national value added by using domestic resources, and (5) Quality of life. 
 
All the panels except the Education and Human Resources Panel) prepared more than 1200 
statements that were likely to play an important role in realizing their visions for 2023. The 
Project Office, in close co-operation with the panels, carefully examined all the statements 
for the clarity of expression, technology and policy relevance, and double postings. The 
final list included 413 unique statements (grouped in 11 questionnaires), 104 of which 
appeared  in  more  than  one  questionnaire.  The  first  round  of  the  Delphi  process  was 
commenced on May 12, 2003, and was completed around mid-June 2003.  
 
The Delphi survey forms were posted to more than 7000 people of different professional 
standings and expertise. The respondents were able to fill out either the printed version or 
the on-line version of the questionnaire by using the username and password provided by 
the Project Office. Those respondents who have fully expressed their opinion on at least 
five statements were offered a one-year subscription to one of the two monthly popular 
journals of TUBITAK, “Bilim ve Teknik” (Science and Technique) and “Bilim Cocuk” 
(Science and the Kid). 
 
                                                
9 The identified variables in the Delphi survey were asked in the following order: the level of expertise, 
Turkey’s current position, the scientific/technological stage to start with, policy tools to be used, expected 
realisation time, and expected impact on competitiveness, scientific and technological capacity, environment, 
national value added, and the quality of life. The ‘realisation time’ here refers to the expected realisation of 
each Delphi statement in Turkey conditional on the implementation of appropriate policies.   16 
Because of the increasingly important role played by multidisciplinary research in R&D 
activities,  it  was  quite  difficult  to  classify  Delphi  statements  into  different  categories. 
Therefore, an “individualized Delphi survey” was developed for the on-line version, where 
the respondents could create their  own individual  surveys by using a simple keyword-
search  interface.  The  individualized  Delphi  survey  enabled  respondents  to  identify  the 
statements that are closely related with their area of expertise without going through all the 
statements. 
 
The response rate of the first round of the Delphi process was 32%, with a total of around 
45,000 responses received for all 413 statements. The results of the Delphi survey were 
provided to the panels for their consideration and evaluation. At a later stage of the project, 
the whole process, the results and their analysis were published in the form of a report. 
 
The panels reviewed the results of the two-round Delphi survey and responded to them in 
their final reports, the first versions of which were submitted to the Project Office on July 
24, 2003. Although the panels were free to comment on, or even disregard the Delphi 
results, later versions of the final reports reflected more upon the Delphi survey. 
 
In their final reports, the Panels came up with 94 Technological Activity Areas (TAAs). A 
TAA is a cluster of technological developments, mostly based on the Delphi statements 
and leading, for instance, to a new or improved product and/or service. The TAAs were 
envisaged to support their socio-economic objectives. A roadmap was prepared for each 
TAA  in  a  format  prepared  by  the  Project  Office.  Each  roadmap  included  the  list  of 
technologies on which competence needed to be developed to reach the TAA goals. 
 
Following the submission of the final reports, the Project Office critically analyzed them 
and came up with a synthesis report, which included the review of the process, a summary 
of  each  panel  report  in  a  coherent  format,  as  well  as  the  analysis  of  findings  and 
recommendations of the panels. The study carried out by the Project Office amalgamated 
the  94  TAAs  proposed  by  the  panels  and  classified  them  under  four  categories  by 
considering their relations to “Competitive Advantage”, “Quality of Life”, “Sustainable 
Development” and “Information Society”. 
   17 
Subsequently,  a  workshop  was  held  to  identify  the  “strategic  technology  fields” 
underpinning  the  four  categories  of  TAAs.  The  Project  Office  classified  the  strategic 
technology  fields  under  eight  categories  including  “Information  and  Communication 
Technologies”,  “Biotechnology  and  Genetic  Engineering”,  “Nanotechnology”, 
“Mechatronics”,  “Production  Processes  and  Technologies”,  “Materials  Technologies”, 
“Energy and Environmental Technologies” and “Design and Development Tools”. During 
the period from May to July 2004, expert groups, called “Strategic Technology Groups”, 
carried out a detailed technical study in order to set the strategies in the form of a 20-year 
roadmap for each strategic technology fields.  
 
5.2 Interactions between the context, content and process of the exercise 
In spite of the common systematic process designed for all panels in the Program, various 
changes  and  deviations  emerged  during  the  project  process.  Saritas  [1]  states  that  the 
deviations from the originally designed process and the occurrence of different practices 
among the panels are due to the interactions between the context (external and internal), 
content and process of the exercise. To be able to demonstrate some of the deviations and 
differences and to investigate their reasons the initially designed process will be presented 
along  with  the  actual  processes  of  two  panels.  The  differences  between  the  three 
representations  will  exhibit  the  difference  between  the  Program-as-designed  and  the 
Program-as-  practiced.  Figure.1  exhibits  the  initially  designed  process.  Subsequently, 
Figure.2 and 3 exhibit the deployment of the designed process in the Construction and 
Infrastructure Panel and the Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) Panel.  
 
*Figure.1: Initially designed process for the Program 
 
**Figure.2: The actual process of the Construction and Infrastructure Panel 
 
***Figure.3: The actual process of the ICT Panel 
 
In the figures the white boxes show the components in the initial design (Figure 1) and the 
activities practiced as specified in the initial design (Figure 2 and 3). The grey and black 
color scheme used in Figure 2 and 3 helps to distinguish the deviations from the initial 
design in the processes of the Construction and Infrastructure Panel and the ICT panel. The 
black boxes alone illustrate the differences between the processes of the two panels.   18 
 
The figures illustrate that different outputs emerged as a result of the differences in the 
process of the two panels. For instance, the output of the Construction and Infrastructure 
Panel  included  the  list  of  priority  areas  and  a  ‘who/what’  list  which  clarified  the 
distribution of the initiatives needed among stakeholders, whilst the output of the IT panel 
included explicit policy proposals. 
 
According to the contextualist perspective of Saritas [1] mentioned earlier, the differences 
between the original design of the institutional Foresight programs and the actual process 
practiced are due to the interactions between the context (external and internal), content 
and process of the exercise. A number of implications can be mentioned as a result of this 
interaction. In the following paragraphs some examples will be given.    
 
Regarding  the  impact  of  the  external  context  on  the  process,  the  effects  of  economic 
fluctuations in the country on the Program can be given as an example. When the Foresight 
Program started in 2002 the country was experiencing a major economic crisis. In this 
turmoil, people in the country were very pessimistic and lacked motivation to think about 
the long term future. The economic problems in the country had morale implications on the 
panel members, whose hopes were diminished for a better future and thus tended to focus 
on current problems of the country and their sectors. The Project Office tried to encourage 
the panel members to think future oriented without being stuck on the current problems. 
 
Covering mainly the structural and behavioral factors in the organization of the exercise, 
internal  context  was  significantly  influential  on  the  project  process.  Some  of  the 
differences occurred between the designed process and the actual process can be attributed 
to the differences among panelists in terms of their different expectations, experiences and 
personalities.  For  instance,  there  were  dominant  members  in  some  panels  and  these 
members directed the work of the panel. Because of the strong impact of organizational 
and human behaviors on the process Loveridge and Saritas [18] characterize Foresight as a 
“methodologically  pedestrian”  activity.  The  role  of  behavioral  influences  is  rarely 
discussed  in  Foresight  exercises,  though  Saritas  [1]  demonstrates  that  they  have 
implications on the exercises in many respects. 
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In the Vision 2023 Foresight Program, the Project Office noticed differences between the 
attitudes of industrialists and academicians during the panel activities. These differences 
became  more  visible  in  the  panels  where  there  was  an  uneven  representation  of 
stakeholders. As a result, in some cases the views either industrialists or academicians 
were dominant in the panels. For instance, the Chemistry and Textiles Panel was broken 
into two  separate  panels.  Initially,  the  Chemistry  and  Textiles  sectors were  considered 
together  in  order  to  keep  the  number  of  panels  low.  However,  the  panel  topics  were 
“divorced”, as stated by the Project Office, following the tensions of the background and 
possibly the interests of panelists, who wanted to lead to the panel. Besides the behavioral 
factors, the factors stemming from the content of the fields due to the different natures of 
the Chemistry and Textiles sectors stimulated this separation. Another panel, the Health 
and Pharmaceutical, worked like three separate panels as “health”, “pharmaceuticals” and 
“medical equipment” due to similar reasons.  
 
Another reason which created obstacles to the communication and interaction within the 
panels was the turnover of the panel members. Some panelists left the exercise, because 
they lost their motivation. On the other hand, new panelists came in even in the final stages 
of the exercise. Since the Program was considered as a dynamic and living process, the 
turnover of the participants was considered to be natural. 
 
The factors stemming from the nature and characteristics of the issue at hand are also 
influential  on  the  practices.  This  amounts  to  the  relationship  between  the  content  and 
process of the exercise, which was liable from some of the deviations from the initial 
project  process  and  the  differences  in  the  panel  process  in  the  Vision  2023  Foresight 
Program. One of the first and the most notable examples was related to the processes of the 
thematic panels in the exercise. 
 
Initially the thematic panels were planned to start their works after the sectoral panels. This 
was due to the consideration that the thematic topics would arise from the work of the 
sectoral panels. Once sectoral panels built their vision and mission and identify technology 
areas, the thematic areas, which could underpin their common future requirements, would 
be identified. These topics would be horizontal between the sectoral panels. They could be 
either  technology  based  such  as  biotechnology  and  nanotechnology  or  social  such  as 
education  and  environment.  However,  because  of  the  pressures  from  the  Steering   20 
Committee, two thematic panels were established on Education and Human Resources, and 
Environment and Sustainable Development when the Program began. Thus, the thematic 
panels started their works together with the sectoral panels. Then the question arose: What 
would the thematic panels do? There was no answer for this question. Consequently the 
thematic  panels  were  decided  to  use  the  same  methodology  as  the  sectoral  panels  as 
described  in  the  task  definition  document.  Thus  a  weakness  of  the  program  became 
existent. As a consequence a number of problems were faced related with the works of the 
thematic panels.  The  Education  and Human Resources Panel did  not work properly in 
accordance with the outline set for panels. They submitted their final report long after the 
whole process is over. The Environment and Sustainable Development Panel tried to apply 
what the sectoral panels did and carried out their work in the same format, which did not fit 
well with the topic.  
 
Another  factor  related  to  the  content  that  led  to  differences  in  panel  work  was  the 
technological intensity of the sectors. Some sectoral panels in the exercise such as the IT 
and  the  Manufacturing  and  Materials  panels  were  proposing  new  technologies  for  the 
future. On the other hand, there was another group of panels such as the Transportation and 
Tourism and the Construction and Infrastructure panels, which were mainly technology 
users. When the panels in both groups were asked to produce roadmaps, the technology 
user panels could not properly respond, because they were not fully informed about the 
future availability of the technologies for their use. 
 
Another  deviation  from  the  initial  project  process  was  observed  in  the  case  of  the 
assessment of the Delphi statements for the prioritization of TAAs and Technology Fields 
(TFs). Although the Project Office envisaged the use of quantitative methods for all Delphi 
statements in the final prioritization process, in the actual project process this was regarded 
to be difficult and unduly constraining panel’s work. The Project Office calculated the 
feasibility and attractiveness scores for all Delphi statements on the basis of the Delphi 
survey and provided these to all Panels. The Panels were, then, free to use any method for 
prioritization. 
 
6. Outcome of Vision 2023 
The Vision 2023 project involved the first-ever national Foresight Program of Turkey. The 
Program focused mainly on determining the priority areas of technology. The estimated   21 
cost of the Program was 200,000 Euro. TUBITAK allocated the 100% of this amount from 
its own resources. The tangible outputs of the project included 24 reports, specifically, 12 
panel  reports,  1  Delphi  report,  3  synthesis  reports,  and  the  reports  of  the  8  Strategic 
Technology Groups. These reports, together with the reports of the other three sub-projects 
of the Vision 2023, have been produced with the hope they would be utilized at the public, 
academic and  corporate  level  in  developing  S&T  policies  of  the  governmental  bodies, 
research institutions, academia, companies and NGOs. 
 
So far there have been two developments in this regard. First, the resolutions of the “2004 
Turkish Economy Congress” organized by the State Planning Organization
10 have adopted 
the S&T Policies Working Group Report, which was exclusively based on the findings and 
recommendations outlined in the synthesis reports. 
 
Secondly, as the Vision 2023 Project was initially launched with the purpose of preparing a 
science  and  technology  strategy  document  for  a  20-year  period,  TUBITAK  formed  a 
Strategy Group with the mandate of preparing such a document based on the findings and 
recommendations of the reports. In August 2004, the Strategy Group submitted the draft 
entitled “National Science and Technology Policies: 2003-2023 Strategy Document”. The 
proposed strategy has three essential elements: 
1.  Focusing on strategic (priority) areas of technology (In this context, three generic 
and emerging areas of technology, and 42 specific technology fields were proposed, 
all based on the two-year long consultation period of the Foresight exercise) 
2.  Increasing  R&D  expenditure  (with  specific  targets  for  both  public  and  private 
sector share) 
3.  Development of R&D manpower (with specific targets) 
 
The strategy document proposed that a “National R&D Fund” be established and managed, 
and the following mechanisms be adopted, with which a Turkish Research Area would be 
established around the priority areas: 
1.  National Programs  
2.  Public Procurement 
                                                
10 State Planning Organisation (SPO) is an undersecretary reporting directly to the Prime Minister and 
responsible for five-year development plans of Turkey.   22 
3.  Targeted Projects (from public  bodies and sector organizations along with  their 
own strategic plans). 
The  document  emphasized  the  importance  of  public  awareness  and  commitment  of 
Governments to science and technology issues, and proposed initiation of five national 
programs in selected priority areas in 2005. Finally, the need for systematic monitoring and 
evaluation of the steps taken, as well as continuous Foresight was underlined. 
 
The draft strategy document was brought to the agenda of the 10th meeting of the SCST 
held in 8 September 2004. The SCST decided that a final strategy document and a five-
year action plan would be prepared by TUBITAK after all the SCST member organizations 
express their views  on the draft document. The SCST endorsed,  in its 11
th meeting in 
March 2005, 14 TAAs and 8 strategic TFs as “priority” areas as suggested by the Vision 
2023 Strategy Document, which was produced by TUBITAK. The SCST asked all public 
institutions  including  public  universities  to  take  into  consideration  these  technological 
areas in their R&D activities, R&D funding, and graduate education and research programs. 
TUBITAK itself declared both officially and in a meeting with the European Commission 
during the accession screening process that  these  TAAs and TFs constitute its  priority 
research topics. However, the “National Defense Research Program” and the “National 
Space Research Program” (announced in the 11
th SCST meeting in March 2005) as well as 
the “Public Research Programs” on Agriculture, Health and Energy (announced in the 12
th 
SCST meeting in September 2005) remained incompatible with the basic philosophy of the 
Vision 2023 project. Curiously enough, the “Science and Technology Action Policy Action 
Plan”,  which  was  adopted  at  the  11
th  SCST  meeting,  called  for  “setting  priorities  for 
science and technology”, although a decision on S&T priorities, in line with the Vision 
2023 Strategy Document, was taken in the very same meeting. Concisely, after two years 
of its completion the findings and recommendations of the Vision 2023 Program have not 
been fully incorporated into the actual S&T policy making of Turkey, and the country still 
lacks a well defined S&T strategy supported by structural reforms deemed necessary since 
the beginning of the process.  
 
Vision  2023  process  has  mobilized  a  considerable  number  of  people  from  industry, 
academia and public bodies. It also attracted the attention of mass media to a certain extent. 
In  this  way  some  intangible  outcome  of  the  exercise,  such  as  raising  awareness  and 
increasing commitment to science and technology issues have been achieved during the   23 
process  of  implementing  the  exercise.  However,  this  momentum  was  by  no  means 
sustainable,  in  that  the  current  attitude  of  the  stakeholders  to  S&T  issues  is  not  any 
different from the past. 
 
These observations constitute yet another example of the interrelatedness of context and 
the process of change. The fact that Turkey has been mainly a technology user rather than 
a technology producer has made the process susceptible to changing priorities and attitude 
of decision makers. This has been influential in declining importance attached to the S&T 
issues in general, and the exercise itself in particular.   
 
Although the initially envisaged outcome of the Vision 2023 project could not be fully 
realized,  the  process  itself  was  instrumental  for  the  accumulation  of  knowledge  and 
capabilities regarding S&T policy making in Turkey. A part of knowledge and capabilities 
was  codified  in  the  form  of,  for  example,  the  Delphi  software  and  lists  of  strategic 
technology fields. Moreover, two on-line databases, one on the researchers in Turkey and 
the other on the research infrastructure, were prepared as a result of the project.
11 These 
two databases now provide information necessary for any further study on S&T policy. 
Thanks to the capabilities accumulated during the Vision 2023 process, TUBITAK was 
involved actively in the organization of UNIDO-led Foresight training programs. 
 
Finally,  the  Vision  2023  project in  general, and  the  Technology  Foresight  Program  in 
particular constituted an important step towards harmonization of Turkish S&T system 
with that of the European Union. First of all, with this project Turkey responded to the call 
for Foresight in the High-Level Expert Group Report “Thinking, debating and shaping the 
future: Foresight in Europe” which stated that:  
“Starting from a science & technology perspective, Foresight activities contribute to the 
development  of  the  European  knowledge-base  and  propose  visions  for  the  future  of 
European society” [19].  
 
Secondly, Turkey has actively taken part in the joint initiative of 15 countries (11 EU 
Member  States, 3  Candidate  Countries and  one associated country)  to  coordinate  their 
national Foresight programs, with a view to increase their national and European impact 
                                                
11 These databases are available at http://arabis.tubitak.gov.tr and http://tarabis.tubitak.gov.tr .   24 
and to implement joint programs. The coordination activities envisaged in this networking 
initiative  called  the  “ForSociety”  also  aim  to  provide  effective  support  to  European 
scientific and technological integration along with the spirit of the ERA, especially in view 
of the enlarged EU and operational implementation of Article 169.
 12 
 
A systematic evaluation of the process and its impacts is yet to be done. The impact of the 
whole process would be better evaluated, if decision makers clarified their long term S&T 
vision and objectives, as well as their policy on the future of Foresight activities in Turkey.  
 
7. Conclusions 
Considering the unique requirements, it was believed that Foresight was a necessity for 
Turkey, where there were a lack of ownership and political support for the S&T policies, 
fragmentation of researchers and resources, and isolation from the other industrial policies. 
For  this  purpose  a  systematic  prioritization  process  was  designed.  Learning  from  the 
experiences of other countries, the methodology drawn for the Program was built mainly 
on the use of expert panels and the Delphi method. Throughout the article, it was discussed 
that the systematically designed process was changed during the execution of the exercise 
and  different  practices  emerged  among  different  sectoral  panels.  The  contextual 
perspective adopted was helpful to acknowledge this situation. 
 
The  description  and  analysis  of  the  process  from  a  contextualist  perspective  has 
demonstrated  that  Foresight  is  embedded  in  other  systems,  which  were  described  as 
external  and  internal  contexts.  Foresight  is  integrated  into  these  contexts.  The  activity 
receives inputs from these contexts and strives to improve or change them. During this 
process  the  Foresight  activity  entails  a  socially  interactive  process,  where  there  is  a 
considerable role and impact of organizational and individual behaviors. 
 
The descriptions and analyses of the Vision 2023 Turkish National Technology Foresight 
Program have revealed that the process design is a key to a successful Foresight exercise. 
The methodology designed and the participants engaged should be fit-for-purpose. This 
first requires the specification of the contexts where institutional Foresight is embedded in 
and is expected to improve or change. Then the content of the exercise is built from the 
                                                
12 See http://www.era-net.forsociety.net   25 
context by determining the major areas for investigation. Subsequently, the process of the 
exercise is designed to tailor the uniqueness of the context of the exercise and the nature of 
the issue at hand in the content of the exercise. 
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Figure.1: Initially designed process for the Program 
 
 
Figure.2: The actual process of the Construction and Infrastructure Panel 
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Figure.3: The actual process of the ICT Panel 
 
 